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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4103(2)0).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
ISSUE NO. 1: May Appellant Beverly Mast challenge a jury instruction, where
she filed no alternate instruction, she did not preserve an objection to the challenged
instruction, and she has made no showing that she was harmed by the challenged
instruction?
ISSUE NO. 2: If Ms. Mast may now challenge the jury instruction, which limits
"actual damages" under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA") to
economic pecuniary damages, was the instruction erroneous?
Standard of Review. Whether a jury instruction correctly states the law presents
a question of law reviewed for correctness. State v. Houskeeper, 62 P.3d 444, 447 (Utah
2002).
ISSUE NO. 3: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Ms. Mast's post
trial Rule 59 motion, where the motion was a tardy attempt to discredit a witness with
previously available or inadmissible "evidence" and was also a tardy attempt to object to
the jury instruction regarding emotional distress damages, and where Ms. Mast's own
moving papers showed that the alleged error was harmless because her emotional distress
arose from the foreclosure sale of her house, and not from the alleged failure by Litton
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Loan Servicing P.C. to respond to a letter allegedly mailed by Ms. Mast 18 months
earlier.
Standard of Review. "The trial judge, in granting or denying a motion for a new
trial, has broad latitude. This Court will not overturn that disposition absent a clear abuse
of discretion by the trial judge." Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832, (Utah
1984).
STATUTE WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE
OF THE APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL
REAL ESTATE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES ACT
TITLE 12 UNITED STATES CODE

§ 2605. Servicing of mortgage loans and administration of escrow accounts
(e) Duty of loan servicer to respond to borrower inquiries
(1) Notice of receipt of inquiry
(A) In general
If any servicer of a federally related mortgage loan receives a
qualified written request from the borrower (or an agent of the
borrower) for information relating to the servicing of such loan, the
servicer shall provide a written response acknowledging receipt of
the correspondence within 20 days (excluding legal public holidays,
Saturdays, and Sundays) unless the action requested is taken within
such period.
(B) Qualified written request
For purposes of this subsection, a qualified written request shall be a
written correspondence, other than notice on a payment coupon or
other payment medium supplied by the servicer, that(i) includes, or otherwise enables the servicer to identify, the
name and account of the borrower;
(ii) includes a statement of the reasons for the belief of the
borrower, to the extent applicable, that the account is in error
2

or provides sufficient detail to the servicer regarding other
information sought by the borrower.
(2) Action with respect to inquiry
Not later than 60 days (excluding legal public holidays, Saturdays, and
Sundays) after the receipt from any borrower of any qualified written
request under paragraph (1) and, if applicable, before taking any action with
respect to the inquiry of the borrower, the servicer shall(A) make appropriate corrections in the account of the borrower,
including the crediting of any late charges or penalties, and transmit
to the borrower a written notification of such correction (which shall
include the name and telephone number of a representative of the
servicer who can provide assistance to the borrower);
(B) after conducting an investigation, provide the borrower with a
written explanation or clarification that includes—
(i) to the extent applicable, a statement of the reasons for
which the servicer believes the account of the borrower is
correct as determined by the servicer; and
(ii) the name and telephone number of an individual employed
by, or the office or department of, the servicer who can
provide assistance to the borrower; or
(C) after conducting an investigation, provide the borrower with a
written explanation or clarification that includes—
(i) information requested by the borrower or an explanation of
why the information requested is unavailable or cannot be
obtained by the servicer; and
(ii) the name and telephone number of an individual employed
by, or the office or department of, the servicer who can
provide assistance to the borrower.
(3) Protection of credit rating
During the 60-day period beginning on the date of the servicer's receipt
from any borrower of a qualified written request relating to a dispute
regarding the borrower's payments, a servicer may not provide information
regarding any overdue payment, owed by such borrower and relating to
such period or qualified written request, to any consumer reporting agency
(as such term is defined under section 1681a of Title 15).
(f) Damages and costs
3

Whoever fails to comply with any provision of this section shall be liable to the
borrower for each such failure in the following amounts:
(1) Individuals
In the case of any action by an individual, an amount equal to the sum of
(A) any actual damages to the borrower as a result of the failure
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF T H E CASE.

After seven years of periodic defaults by Appellant Beverly Mast - first on her
mortgage loan, then on various forbearance agreements - Ms. Mast's house was sold at a
foreclosure sale. R. 5, 13, 1679 at p.6 line 25 through p.7 line 11, p.12 line 3 through
p. 13 line 18, p. 16 lines 4-12, and p. 19 line 13 through p.21 line 7. The sale occurred on
July 16, 2002. R. 13.
On April 22, 2003, Ms. Mast filed a federal action similar to the present case. The
federal court dismissed that action on December 15, 2003. R. 43.
On December 30, 2003, Ms. Mast shifted venues and filed her Complaint in the
Third District Court. Ms. Mast named several Defendants, generally attempted to blame
them for the foreclosure, alleged multiple violations of RESPA, the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (the "FDCPA"), and the Fair Housing Act (the "FHA"), and attempted to
state claims of common law fraud and intentional or reckless infliction of emotional
distress. R. 1-34.
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B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW.

All properly served Defendants responded to Ms. Mast's Complaint with motions
to dismiss. R. 38-79, 271-283. The trial court dismissed all claims against Defendants
Salomon Smith Barney, Inc. ("Salomon") and First Madison Services, Inc., formerly
known as Clayton National, Inc. ("First Madison"). R. 469-471. The court dismissed all
but one claim against Defendant Litton Loan Servicing, L.P., ("Litton"). R. 464-469,
479-480.
The surviving claim arose under 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e), which provides that certain
borrowers may challenge errors or request information about their mortgage loans by
pending a "qualified written request" to the loan servicer. The servicer is then required to
respond in writing. Ms. Mast claims she sent a qualified written request on January 4,
2001. Litton has no record of ever having received such a request. R. 1679 at p.2 line 15
through p.5 line 5.
The RESPA claim was tried to a jury on September 4 and 5, 2007. The jury found
that Ms. Mast had sent a qualified written request, but awarded her no damages, finding
that any damages "were caused by her own actions or inactions, and not by Litton9s
failure to respond in a timely manner to Plaintiffs January 4, 2001 letter." R. 1473-1475.
Plaintiff filed a Motion to Alter Judgment (Additur) in The Alternative Motion for
New Damages Hearing on September 20, 2007. R. 1483-1492,1610-1621. The trial
court denied the motion on December 7, 2007. R. 1660-1663. This appeal followed.
5

C.

ADDITIONAL FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW.

1.

Ms. Mast's Failure to Present An Alternate Jury Instruction.

Ms. Mast did not file a proposed jury instruction on emotional distress damages, or
on any other topic.
Pursuant to the trial court's instruction, Litton filed its Proposed Jury Instructions.
R. 1430-1441. Litton's proposed instructions included the following language on
damages, which was adopted by the trial court as Instruction 40:
"Actual damages" include only those economic pecuniary damages that directly
relate to the Defendant's failure to respond to the "qualified written request."
Economic pecuniary damages include out-of-pocket expenses.
No damages for emotional distress are recoverable for a violation of RESPA
§ 2605(e).
No punitive damages are recoverable for a violation of RESPA § 2605(e).
R. 1437, 1470.
The record contains no proposed instructions from Ms. Mast. Litton never
received any proposed instructions from her. Ms. Mast has not provided this Court with
any portion of the trial record indicating that she filed an instruction on emotional distress
damages, because no such record exists.
In a portion of the trial proceedings which has not been transcribed, reference is
made to an "incomplete" set of proposed jury instructions on a flash drive, presumably

handed by Ms. Mast's counsel directly to the judge, without filing. The judge indicated
that he had not read them. Ms. Mast never placed any proposed instruction into the
record by filing it, never gave a copy of any proposed instruction to Litton, and never read
any proposed instruction into the record.
There was no discussion during trial which revealed the content of any
"incomplete" instructions on a flash drive, or which even hinted at whether an alternative
instruction on emotional distress damages was among the "incomplete" instructions on a
flash drive.
Indeed, Ms. Mast's counsel's conduct at trial suggests otherwise. In a preliminary
discussion of damages, Ms. Mast's counsel read some parentheticals from a case cited in
Litton's proposed instructions, In re Tomasevic, 273 B.R. 682 (M.D. Fla. 2002). See R.
1437. However, Ms. Mast's counsel made no reference to any alternative damages
ibstruction proposed by him, or to any authority of his own.
2.

Ms. Mast's Waiver of Any Objection to The Damages Instruction.

Ms. Mast has failed to provide the Court with any portion of the trial transcript
indicating that she properly preserved an objection to Instruction 40. There is no such
record, because Ms. Mast's counsel expressly waived any objection.
In her appellate brief, Ms. Mast cites three places in the record, R. 1470, 1605,
1635, 1650-51, where she allegedly "preserved" an objection to Instruction 40. See Brief
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of Appellant at 2. None of those citations shows an objection at trial. The first citation is
to the challenged instruction itself. R. 1470. The remaining citations are to post-trial
filings, in which Ms. Mast attempted to raise an objection after the fact. R. 1605, 1635,
1650-51.
Addendum 1 is a transcript of the jury instruction conference held after both sides
had rested.1 In that conference, the trial judge explained that he would give counsel time
to read the final instructions, and then give them an opportunity to make a record of their
objections. R. 1680 at p.3 line 4 through p.4 line 15. The judge then announced his
determination that RESPA does not provide for punitive or emotional distress damages.
R. 1680 at p.4 lines 17-23.
After a break, counsel and the court went through the instructions, with both sides
making comments, none of which related to the instruction on emotional distress
damages. At the close of that discussion, the judge asked for objections: "Any objections
to the jury instructions as just changed?" R. 1680 at p.7 lines 15-16. Ms. Mast's counsel
responded, "Your Honor, just for the record I [sic] still going back to the Celotex thing
but the burden of showing that the letter was not received is upon the defendant but other
than that, no objections." R. 1680 at p.7 lines 20-23 (emphasis added).

1

Litton is moving simultaneously to supplement the record with the partial
transcripts contained in Addenda 1 and 3.
8

3.

Ms. Mast's Failure to Demonstrate That She Was Harmed by The
Instruction Precluding Emotional Distress Damages.

Ms. Mast has failed to provide any trial record showing that she gave evidence
sufficient to justify an award of emotional distress damages. Without such evidence, the
jury instruction was harmless, even if it had been erroneous.
The record which Ms. Mast does provide - her own post-trial briefing - shows that
her alleged emotional distress arose from the loss of her house in a foreclosure sale on
July 16, 2002, not from a technical RESPA violation a year and a half earlier. In post trial
briefing, Ms. Mast's counsel characterized his client's testimony on emotional distress as
follows: "During day one of trial, before the Court's decision, Ms. Mast did indeed
testify concerning her emotional distress and linked that to Litton asserting that they had
stolen her home from her." R. 1635-1636.
If Ms. Mast had properly submitted the relevant trial transcript, it would show
ftiat the foregoing characterization is fairly accurate. At trial, Ms. Mast's counsel tried
hiightily to lead her to testify that she suffered severe emotional distress because Litton
didn't specifically respond to her January 4, 2001, letter - even though Litton was
Contemporaneously responding to numerous oral communications on the same subject.
To her counsel's obvious frustration, Ms. Mast couldn't be led. She kept returning to the
July 2002 foreclosure sale, where her house was allegedly "stolen" from her, testifying
that she "went through Hell" and wanted to commit suicide when she went to the
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courthouse and saw her house being sold. Her testimony was dramatic, but completely
off point.
The house was sold because Ms. Mast made no payments during the year and a
half that Litton serviced her loan. R. 1679 at p.5 line 17 through p.8 line 12. Instead, for
several months after Litton took over servicing of the loan, Litton had telephone
conversations with Richard Fechner, Ms. Mast's boyfriend who was designated to speak
for her. During those conversations, Litton agreed repeatedly to delay foreclosure while
Ms. Mast attempted to arrange refinancing. R. 1679 at p.9 line 10 through p. 17 line 17.
After a year of no payments and a series of unkept promises that new financing
was imminent, Litton scheduled a foreclosure sale on January 3, 2002, at 10:15 a.m. Ms.
Mast filed a bankruptcy petition at 8:58 a.m. on the same day. R. 1353. Salomon, the
holder of the note, moved for relief from the automatic stay. Salomon's unopposed
motion was granted by the bankruptcy court on May 30, 2002, and the foreclosure was
completed on July 16, 2002. R. 23, 1353.
The RESPA claim was based on Ms. Mast's assertion that she mailed Exhibit 6,
attached hereto as Addendum 2, on January 4, 2001. Exhibit 6 is rambling and confusing.
Its principal complaint, however, is that Ms. Mast was not delinquent when Litton took
over servicing her loan. Litton admits it did not respond specifically to Exhibit 6, because
Litton has no record of ever receiving it.
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However, during Litton's conversations with Mr. Fechner during the same time
period, Mr. Fechner questioned the accuracy of Litton's records respecting Ms. Mast's
payments. R. 1679 at p. 18 lines 15-18. In response to those questions, Litton obtained
records from the previous servicer, examined them, and determined that Ms. Mast had,
indeed, been delinquent at the time Litton took over servicing of the loan. R. 1679 at p. 18
line 20 through p.21 line 6. Thus, Litton had responded to the principal complaint of the
January 4, 2001 letter, Exhibit 6. There was no evidence ever submitted that, by the time
of the foreclosure sale, there was any dispute about the amounts due and owing. And
there was no dispute that, by the time of the foreclosure sale, Ms. Mast had made no
payments for a year and a half.
Undaunted by the facts, Ms. Mast attempted throughout the litigation to suggest
some linkage between Litton's substantively meaningless failure to respond to the January
4, 2001, letter, and the sale of her house. The Court granted Litton's pre-trial motion to
limit the issues at trial to the January 4, 2001, letter. R. 1024-1035, 1252-1253. Ms. Mast
ignored the Court's ruling by continuing to express her intention to introduce evidence at
trial relating to the foreclosure sale. R. 1257-1266, 1271-1278.
Finally, Litton filed its In Limine Motion to Limit Introduction of Damages
Evidence at Trial Only to Actual Damages That Are Causally Connected to The Alleged
RESPA Breach. R. 1345-1385. The trial court granted that motion prior to the
presentation of any evidence. Addendum 3, R. 1681 at p.3, is a transcript of the trial
11

court's ruling excluding evidence of damages allegedly flowing from the foreclosure sale.
Ms. Mast has not appealed that ruling, but she has continued, even here, to assert that she
is somehow entitled to damages because of the foreclosure sale.
4.

Ms. Mast's Post-Trial Attempt to Impeach The Testimony of Litton's
Witness and to Argue for An Award of Emotional Distress Damages.

Litton's main witness at trial was Oscar Southall, who managed Litton's
Foreclosure Collections Group in January 2001. R. 1679 at p.2 lines 5 through 14. Mr.
Southall's testimony consisted entirely of explaining Litton's recordkeeping procedures,
and authenticating and explaining Litton's records showing the course of dealing with Ms.
Mast's loan.
After trial, Ms. Mast filed a Motion to Alter Judgment (Additur) in The Alternative
Motion for New Damages Hearing, allegedly based on "new evidence." R. 1619-1620.
The "new evidence" consisted of an after-the-fact attempt to impeach Mr. Southall's trial
testimony with the February 16, 2005, deposition of Edward C. Hill, another Litton
employee, and with other documents which were likewise not "new," or which were
hearsay and irrelevant. See R. 1493-1500 and attachments thereto. In her post-trial brief,
Ms. Mast also made an after-the-fact argument for an award of emotional distress damages.
R. 1635-36.
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The trial court denied the motion, explaining that there was no basis for additur,
where there was a specific finding by the jury that Ms. Mast was not damaged by Litton,
and noting that there was no new evidence. R. 1660-1661.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Beverly Mast is not entitled to challenge Instruction 40, which excludes emotional
distress damages for her RESPA claim, for at least three reasons.
First, she failed to propose an alternative instruction. Second, she waived her
objection to the instruction at trial, and post-trial changes of mind are ineffective. Third,
she has failed to show that she was harmed by the instruction. She has not provided the
Court with her trial testimony, but, if she had, it would show that her alleged emotional
distress was caused by the sale of her house, and not by Litton's failure to provide a written
response to a letter she claimed to have mailed 18 months earlier.
The Court need not decide whether Instruction 40 is correct. But, if the question
were to be addressed, the instruction should be sustained. The question of whether
emotional distress damages are available under RESPA is one of first impression in this
jurisdiction, and authority is split in other courts. RESPA is designed to prevent financial
loss. It is not designed to protect dignitary or privacy interests, as opposed to other federal
consumer protection statutes which allow emotional distress damages.
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Ms. Mast appears to have abandoned her appeal of the denial of her post trial
motion. In any event, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Ms. Mast's
attempt to accomplish post-trial what she should have done on cross examination of
Litton's witness, or her attempt post-trial to change her mind and raise an objection to
Instruction 40.
ARGUMENT
A.

T H E TRIAL COURT CAN B E AFFIRMED SIMPLY BECAUSE M S . MAST HAS FAILED
TO PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE RECORD FOR REVIEW.

It was the responsibility of Ms. Mast - and only Ms. Mast - to provide a record
sufficient for review of each issue she has raised on appeal. Ms. Mast has failed to do so,
and "neither the court nor [Litton] is obligated to correct [Ms. MastJ's deficiencies in
providing the relevant portions of the transcript." Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2).
During a two-day trial, three witnesses were called, relevant rulings were made by
the trial court, and a jury instruction conference was held. But, for some reason, Ms. Mast
has chosen to provide only a transcript of the testimony of Litton's main witness, Oscar
Southall.
Ms. Mast has challenged a jury instruction precluding emotional distress damages,
yet she has failed to provide any record of her own proposed instruction, any timely
objection to the challenged instruction, or evidence which would have justified an award of
emotional distress damages had they not been precluded by the challenged instruction.
14

The "power of review is strictly limited to the record presented on appeal. Parties
claiming error below and seeking appellate review have the duty and responsibility to
support their allegations with an adequate record. The record in this case contains only
partial transcripts. As such, where [the Court is] without an adequate record, [it] must
assume the regularity of the proceedings below." Gorostieta v. Parkinson, 17 P.3d 1110,
115 (Utah 2000) (internal quotations and citations omitted). "When crucial matters are not
included in the record, the missing portions are presumed to support the action of the trial
court." State v. Pritchett, 69 P.3d 1278, 1282 (Utah 2003) (holding that appellant's failure
to make a record of relevant bench conference was fatal to appeal).
Applying the rule in this case, the Court should simply presume from Ms. Mast's
failure to provide an adequate record that she never proposed an alternative to Instruction
40 (which, in fact, she did not), that she did not preserve an objection to Instruction 40
(which, in fact, she did not), and that she presented no evidence of harm arising from
Instruction 40 (which, in fact, she did not). The Court should thus affirm the trial court on
the basis of Ms. Mast's failure to provide an adequate record, alone.
B.

Ms. MAST IS NOT ENTITLED TO CHALLENGE JURY INSTRUCTION 40.

1.

Ms. Mast Did Not Propose An Alternative to Instruction 40; If She Had,
It Should Have Required A Relatively High Quantum of Proof of
Emotional Distress.

"[BJefore a party can assert that the trial court erred in either giving or failing to give
an instruction, a party must first submit correct instructions and then, should the court fail
15

to give them, timely except." Pernios v. Covenant Transport, Inc., 86 P.3d 752, 758 (Utah
Ct. App. 2004) (emphasis in original, internal quotations and citations omitted). See also,
e.g., Snyderville Transp. Co., Inc. v. Christiansen, 609 P.2d 939, 942 (Utah 1980) (party
may not challenge jury instruction unless he first proposes correct instruction); Kesler v.
Rogers, 542 P.2d 354, 358 and n. 7 (Utah 1975) (challenge to jury instruction failed where
appellant did not submit request for instruction and in the taking of exceptions to
instructions which were given did not give court "clear and correct" statement as to the
instruction); Shupe v. Menlove. 417 P.2d 246, 248 (Utah 1966) ("In regard to refusal to
give instructions, it is essential that the complaining party has submitted accurate requests,
and that they be neither misleading nor argumentative.").
There is no record that Ms. Mast submitted an instruction which included emotional
distress damages. Had she done so, Litton would have challenged it, had it not contained
language requiring a heightened standard of proof. This is so because courts which have
decided to award emotional distress damages under RESPA have arrived at that decision by
analogizing to federal consumer protection statutes. See Ploog v. Homeside Lending, Inc.,
209 F. Supp. 2d 863, 869-70 (N.D. 111. 2002), and cases cited therein. Under those federal
consumer protedion statutes, courts have cabined the award of emotional distress damages
with a heightened standard of proof.
The Bankruptcy Code, for example, allows Debtors to claim emotional distress
damages as "actual damages" for violations of the automatic stay. But those damages are
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limited to exceptional manifestations of distress with reliable proof. As one court
explained,
"[T]he majority of the courts have denied damages for emotional distress where
there is no medical or other hard evidence to show something more than fleeting or
inconsequential injury." Stinson v. Bi-Rite Restaurant Supply, Inc. et al (In re
Stinson), 295 B.R. 109, 120 n. 8 (9th Cir. BAP 2003)(internal quotations omitted),
affd in part, rev'd in part, 128 Fed.Appx. 30 (9th Cir.2005). The reason why the
courts have required the introduction of medical or other hard evidence in these
types of cases is to ensure that the psychological injury is real-and not feigned-and to
ensure that a cottage industry of filing questionable emotional distress claims does
not clog the dockets of the courts. See, e.g., In re Stinson, 295 B.R. at 119 (quoting
the Seventh Circuit in Aiello v. Providian Fin. Corp., 239 F.3d 876, 880-81 (7th
Cir.2001) and noting that the courts are concerned about the "potential for abuse"
because "[emotional distress] [is] so easy to manufacture").
In re Wingard, 382 B.R. 892, 906 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2008).
Similarly, emotional distress damages can be awarded as "actual damages" under the
Fair Housing Act, but only "for distress which exceeds the normal transient and trivial
aggravation attendant to securing suitable housing." Morgan v. Secretary of Housing and
Urban Dev., 985 F.2d 1451, 1459 (10th Cir. 1993).
Likewise, courts have permitted emotional distress damages as "actual damages"
under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, while setting a high bar as to the required proof. As
one court stated,
Our previous cases establish the type of evidence required to support an award for
emotional damages. We have warned that "[n]ot only is emotional distress fraught
with vagueness and speculation, it is easily susceptible to fictitious and trivial
claims." Price v. City of Charlotte, 93 F.3d 1241, 1250 (4th Cir.1996). For this
reason, although specifically recognizing that a plaintiffs testimony can provide
17

sufficient evidence to support an emotional distress award, we have required a
plaintiff to "reasonably and sufficiently explain the circumstances of [the] injury and
not resort to mere conclusory statements." Ttf. at 1251 (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Bryant v. Aiken Reg'l Med. Ctrs.} Inc., 333 F.3d 536, 546-47 (4th
Cir.2003); Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 653 (4th
Cir.2002). Thus, we have distinguished between plaintiff testimony that amounts
only to "conclusory statements" and plaintiff testimony that "sufficiently
articulate[s]" true "demonstrable emotional distress." Price, 93 F.3d at 1250.
Sloane v. Equifax Information Services, LLC, 510 F.3d 495, 502 (4th Cir. 2007).
Under the appropriate standard of proof, even the conclusory statements offered by
Ms. Mast about her emotional reaction to the foreclosure sale of her house would not have
justified an award of emotional distress damages.
But, whatever the appropriate quantum of proof, no discussion of any proposed jury
instruction awarding emotional distress damages took place because Ms. Mast did not
submit a proposed instruction containing what she contends was a correct statement of the
law. Ms. Mast's appeal fails on this basis, as well.
2.

Ms. Mast Waived Her Objection to Instruction 40.

As set forth in the Statement of the Case and Addendum 1 hereto, Ms. Mast did not
object to Instruction 40. To the contrary, she expressly waived her objection by
affirmatively stating that she had no objections to the jury instructions, other than an
objection about who bore the burden of proof as to Litton's receipt of Ms. Mast's January
4, 2001, letter.
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In a similar case, an appellant had stated at the conclusion of evidence, "Defendants
take no exceptions to the instruction as given by the court." This Court held, "Having
affirmatively expressed complete satisfaction with the court's action, defendants, in all
fairness, are deemed to have waived their exception." Hanson v. General Builders Supply
Co., 389 P.2d 61, 62 (Utah 1964). See also, Chapman v. Uintah County, 81 P.3d 761, 768
(Utah Ct. App. 2003) (where, after discussion of instructions, parties agreed upon contents,
party cannot raise argument on appeal); Williams v. Ogden Union Ry., 230 P.2d 315, 322
(Utah 1951) (where, after discussion and alteration of jury instruction, party indicated
agreement and did not renew an objection, any objection was waived).
In the Brief of the Appellant at 2, Ms. Mast represents to the Court that she
preserved her objection to Instruction 40 by raising the issue of emotional distress damages
in her post-trial briefs. However, "issues raised for the first time in post-judgment motions
are raised too late to be reviewed on appeal." Barson, 682 P.2d at 837; Franklin Financial
v. New Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1984).
In summary, Ms. Mast's challenge to Instruction 40 fails because she not only failed
to preserve an objection, she expressly agreed to the instruction. Her post-trial change of
mind - on which she relies in this appeal - has no effect.
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3.

Ms. Mast Has Failed to Carry Her Burden to Show That She Was
Harmed by Instruction 40.

Even if she had satisfied all the prerequisites to a challenge to Instruction 40, which
she has not, it would be insufficient for Ms. Mast merely to show that Instruction 40 was in
error. Rather, it is her burden to show that she was harmed by the instruction. See, e.g.,
Gorostieta, 17 P.3d at 1115 (court's ruling on jury instruction does not constitute reversible
error unless error is harmful and prejudicial); Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 153-54 (Utah
1987) (Rule 61 "plac[es] upon an appellant the burden of showing not only that an error
occurred, but that it was substantial and prejudicial."); Barson, 682 P.2d at 838
("[A]ppellant has the burden of demonstrating that any error has affected its substantial
rights under Utah R. Civ. P. 61.").
Reversal occurs "only if there is a reasonable likelihood that, absent the error, there
would have been a result more favorable to the complaining party." Tingey v. Christensen,
987 P.2d 588, 592 (Utah 1999) (internal quotations and citations omitted). "On appeal, the
appellant has the burden of demonstrating an error was prejudicial - that there is a
reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings." Covey v.
Covey, 80 P.3d 553, 558 (Utah App. 2003).
Before the trial court adopted Instruction 40, Ms. Mast had put on all her evidence,
rested, and declined to put on any rebuttal. She cannot claim that the presentation of her
case was affected in any way by Instruction 40. Whatever her evidence of damages, she
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had presented it. Therefore, in order to show "harm" from Instruction 40, she must show
that she was deprived of an award of emotional distress damages which she might
otherwise have reasonably expected to win, based on her evidence.
Ms. Mast has made no attempt to make this showing on appeal. She has presented
no record of evidence of any entitlement to emotional distress damages.
Indeed, she cannot do so. As set forth in the Statement of the Case, Ms. Mast's
assertion during the trial and after trial was that she was damaged because Litton "stole"
her house. The loss of the house occurred because of the foreclosure sale, not because
Litton did not send a written response to the letter she claimed to have mailed 18 months
earlier. This is particularly true because, at the time Ms. Mast was allegedly waiting for a
written response to her January 4, 2001, letter, Litton and Ms. Mast's spokesman
communicated several times by telephone about the status of Ms. Mast's loan. Litton
looked into Ms. Mast's claim that she was current on her loan in December 2000, which
was her principal complaint in the letter. Furthermore, there is no dispute that, even if Ms.
Mast had been current on her payments in December 2000, she made no payments
thereafter. Therefore, the January 1, 2001, letter was superfluous and inconsequential.
Because Ms. Mast has completely failed to show that she was damaged by
Instruction 40, the trial court's decision to give it should be affirmed.
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B.

JURY INSTRUCTION 40 Is CORRECT,

This Court need not decide whether "actual damages" under RESPA include
emotional distress damages, because Ms. Mast has not satisfied any of the prerequisites to
appeal and has not made a showing of harm. However, should the Court address the issue,
the decision of the trial court should be affirmed.
The question is one of first impression in this jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit has
never addressed the issue. The federal district courts and bankruptcy courts in other
jurisdictions have split. Compare, e.g., McLaurin v. Title Giant, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2189 *6 (E.D. Mich.) (court finds no persuasive authority supporting recovery of emotional
distress damages under RESPA); In re Tomasevic, 273 B.R. 682, 687 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
2002) (actual damages under RESPA limited to economic pecuniary damages); Katz v.
Dime Sav. Bank FSB, 992 F. Supp. 250, 255-56 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (RESPA designed to
remedy pecuniary harms, no emotional distress damages available), with Ploog, 209 F.
Supp. 2d. at 869-70 and cases cited therein (emotional distress damages are available under
RESPA); Hrubec v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 829 F. Supp 1502, 1504-06 (N.D.
111. 1993) (analogizing to statutes protecting privacy interests, deciding that emotional
distress damages are available under RESPA).
Litton believes that the cases holding that RESPA does not provide for emotional
distress damages are correct. The contrary cases permitting emotional distress damages beginning with Hrubec - rely on analogies to federal statutes protecting privacy or
22

dignitary interests by, inter alia, prohibiting disclosure of private information. In such
cases, economic injuries would be rare. The usual injury would be emotional distress.
RESPA, by contrast, is not concerned with breaches of privacy. It protects
homeowners from faulty bookkeeping by loan servicers and the losses which might arise
therefrom. It is unnecessary and undesirable to expand the term "actual damages" to
include emotional distress in this context. Bookkeeping errors may cause aggravation, but
not trauma, if they are corrected. If errors are not corrected, and economic losses follow,
then the mortgagor can recover for those losses. Accord, George S. Mahaffey, Jr., A
Product of Compromise: Or Why Non-Pecuniary Damages Should Not Be Recoverable
under Section 2605 of The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 28 Dayton L. Rev. 1
(2002).
Accordingly - should this Court choose to address the correctness of Instruction 40
- it should be affirmed.
C.

Ms. MAST HAS ABANDONED H E R APPEAL OF THE COURT'S POST-TRIAL RULING,

Ms. Mast challenges the trial court's denial of her post trial motion in her Statement
of Issues. Brief of Appellant at 2. However, by the time she reaches the end of her
argument, she runs out of steam and concedes the issue.
Ms. Mast asserts that the testimony given at trial by Litton's witness, Oscar Southall,
"conflicted" with deposition testimony given by another Litton employee, Edward Hill.
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Brief of Appellant at 19. But Ms. Mast, herself, had taken the referenced deposition, two
and a half years before the trial. Had the Hill deposition been useful for impeachment of
Mr. Southall, Ms. Mast could have used it at trial. It was not "new evidence."
After a paragraph discussing Mr. SouthalPs testimony, Ms. Mast abandons the issue
of the denial of her post-trial motion, stating, "Becoming aware of the conflict... Mast
tried to move for a new trial but the trial court denied the request. Since the issue is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion, not much time is taken here to address the issue
further." Brief of Appellant at 19. Ms. Mast then states, in effect, that if she gets a remand
based on Instruction 40, she will be satisfied. Id.
Ms. Mast was wise to abandon her appeal of the denial of her post-trial motion.
Where the motion was little more than a tardy attempt to impeach Oscar Southall with a
two and a half year old deposition, and another tardy attempt to raise an objection to
Instruction 40, the trial court was well within its discretion to deny it.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Mast should not be permitted to challenge Jury Instruction 40. If she is, the
instruction should be held to be correct. The trial court's denial of Ms. Mast's post-trial
motion should be affirmed in all respects.
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INDEX
RULING ON MOTION FOR DAMAGES

Page
4

MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT
Mr. Lee
Mr. Oliver

9,14
10

1

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - SEPTEMBER 6, 2007

2

JUDGE ROBERT FAUST

3

P R O C E E D I N G S

4

THE COURT:

All right, here's where we're at.

I

5

have sent to the printer the final set of jury instructions.

6

We can one of two different things.

7

reading them to you or if you're willing to take just a few

8

more minutes break while we run you a copy for yourselves so

9

you can follow through the jury instructions as I read the

I can either start

10

remaining set to you before we hear closing argument, we can

11

do that as well.

12

minutes so you can have your own set of the jury instructions

13

as I go through them with you?

14

you a set and we'll be right with you.

Could you be willing to wait just a few

All right.

Let me just get

15

MR. LEE:

May we approach?

16

THE COURT: You may, actually let's just take a 5-

17

minute break so we can handle that on the record and while

18

we're getting these copies made.

19

on the...

20
21
22
23

MR. LEE:

That'll save us some time

We were going to review those one more

time.
THE COURT:

If you would like to, right.

So if you

don't mind, we'll just be in recess for five minutes, ten?

24

MR. LEE:

And make some motions as well.
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THE COURT:

We're just going to make you the

1

photocopies.

So you know what we're doing is we have a set

2

of jury instructions for you.

3

counsel not to be happy with the set of instructions that the

4

Court gives and so what they're entitled to do for the

5

purposes of preserving their rights is to place on the record

6

their objections to the jury instructions that I'm giving you

7

and we simply do that outside of your presence and then we'll

8

give you the set of jury instructions.

9

ultimately makes the decision thereon regardless of their
All right.

It's not uncommon for both

I'm the one that

10

objections.

We'll make the photocopy.

I've

11

decided what they'll be, counsel is going to take a look at

12 I it and make their final objections and then if there are any,
13

we'll get you your copies, call you back in and we'll start

14

to get the case to you for closing argument and

15

determination.

Thank you.

16

(Whereupon the jury left the courtroom).

17

THE COURT: The decision that I've made is that the

18

statute will not cover emotional damages.

I've read the

19

article and I'm persuaded by the authority in the rationale

20

that it outlines therein and so I've left that jury

21 I instruction the way that it was, the punitive and emotional
22

damages are not entitled to be covered under this particular

23

statute.

24
25

So that's my ruling.
Would you like to look, both of you look at those

or we can even make you a copy and then if you want, you can

1

save your objections to put them on the record after we let

2

the jury go out.

3

take a short recess and we'll go ahead -

4

(Whereupon a recess was taken)

5

(Videotape begins here 2:41:12)

6

MR. LEE:

It doesn't matter either way.

I will just

I've got Instruction 34, that needs to be

7

changed, the letter was sent to, not received by.

And that

8

ought to, also should be service of qualified written request

9

as a title instead of response, qualified written request.

10

Because this is plaintiff's burden, plaintiffs must establish

11

their letter was sent to defendant.

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. LEE:

14

THE COURT:

15

request.

You were too fast for me.
Sorry.
Okay.

What was the last?

16

MR. LEE:

17

THE COURT:

18
19
20

I've got qualified written

As to the title being changed.
I did.

Service of qualified written

request.
MR. LEE:

In the second line of the first sentence,

just strike out received by and put was sent to.

21

THE COURT:

Was sent to, yeah, January 4, 2001

22

letter was sent to defendant.

23

MR. LEE:

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. LEE:

Right.
Okay.

And then the only other issue that I have

1

is I really don't think that the last instruction 48, should

2

be - should follow the verdict form.

3

placed up in the body with because —

4
5

THE COURT:

I would request that be

I can take 4 6, 47 and 48 and scoot them

up in front of the special jury verdict form if you'd like.

6

MR. OLIVER:

My suggestion with that, Your Honor,

7

if I may is that I suggest just that we strike that 45

8

instruction.

9

an instruction.

10
11

THE COURT:

I actually have a separate jury

instruction - or special verdict form with a cover sheet.

12
13

I don't think that we have to include that as

MR. LEE:
not this?

So that's what you're going to give them,

This is not what they fill out.

14

THE COURT:

I was just going to read it to them and

15

go through it so they were familiar with it before they got

16

this form.

17

MR. OLIVER:

I think we can strike 45 completely.

18

THE COURT:

I can do it either way then, just read

19

them the special jury form if you want to do that.

20

MR. LEE:

21

MR. OLIVER:

22

MR. LEE:

23
24
25

That's what I'd prefer.
That's fine.

We'd like you to move the last three

instructions up before you read the verdict form.
THE COURT:

I'll just take out the special verdict

form altogether out of the —

1

MR. LEE:

Oh, altogether, then just read them the

2

verdict form itself.

3

THE COURT:

4

work?

5

MR. LEE:

6

THE COURT:

7

I'll just read it separate, will that

and 47, correct?

That'll work.
Okay.

All right.

8

MR. OLIVER:

9

THE COURT:

So changes then becomes 45, 4 6
I think we're okay that way.

Are you a fast reader?
I try.

10

Okay, so anything, Mr. Oliver?

11

MR. OLIVER:

12

I didn't see the one in here where the

jury is instructed to find in favor of my client.

13
14

THE COURT:

I haven't put that in for you yet.

Okay.

So are we okay?

16

instructions as just changed?

17

MR. LEE:

18

THE COURT:

20

I'm

sorry.

15

19

Just curious.

Any objections to the jury

No objection here.
I'll print off a final version and I'm

sorry —
MR. OLIVER:

Your Honor, just for the record I

21

still going back to the Cellotex thing but the burden of

22

showing that the letter was not received is upon the

23

defendant but other than that, no objections.

24

THE COURT:

All right.

25

I'm sorry, Pat, but there was enough changes that
7

1

I'm going to have to reprint the instructions and kill a few

2

more trees.

3

instructions and verdict form.

I'm sorry.

And you have the final jury
Right here.

4

Did you get a copy of those, counsel?

5

MR. LEE:

6

THE COURT:

Yes, I did. Sorry
Okay, I'll go make sure we get eight

7 | copies for them as long as we're making the eight sets of the
8

jury instruct ions.

9

this form.

11

I s that all right?
MR. LEE:

10

That way they can follow along with me on

That's fine.

I did have some motions I

wanted to make before everybody has rested.
MR. OLIVER:

12

Your Honor, I don't know if you' re

13

planning on recopying all of those but I think, if I

14

understood ei"ther what you said or I'm suggesting that you

15

don't need to recopy the first 20 pages of it.

16

THE COURT: That's probably a (inaudible).

17

MR. OLIVER: You can just start on Page 20 with
The rest of them you can just collate from

18

Instruction 31.

19

that and you <don't have to recopy.
THE COURT:

20
21

appreciate it

22

record.

Thank you.

Okay, good.

That's a good suggest,ion, I

I (inaudible) if we're on the

I don't know if you told me we were or weren't

23

MR. ?: We are.

24

THE COURT: Counsel?

25 ;

MR. LEE:

Thank you, Your Honor.
8

|

1

THE COURT:

2

MR. LEE:

3

Thank you.

The jury instructions that are now being

copied are the final instructions of this Court?

4

THE COURT:

Yes.

5

MR. LEE:

6

I would like to make first, for the record, a

Thank you.

7

renewal of the directed motion verdict that I made at the

8

close of plaintiff's case.

9

arguments.

I don't intend to rehash the

It's still our contention that the judge, the

10

court should find that there is no basis for a reasonable

11

jury to conclude that the January 4 letter was in fact sent

12

to the West Alabama address and (inaudible).

13

THE COURT:

(inaudible conversation with clerk

14

about copying instructions).

15

MR. LEE:

16

The legal basis is the same as we had set forth

No problem.

17

before.

18

the close of plaintiff's case.

19

record.

20

I'm sorry, counsel.

We understand that the Court did make a ruling at
We would renew that for the

Secondly, however, I want to make a second motion

21

under Rule 50 for directed verdict here on grounds that we

22

assert, of course, should be dispositive.

23

ruled that under Section 2605(e) there are no damages allowed

24

for emotional distress, no damages - punitive damages.

25

is now in the instructions of the Court and the law in this

The Court has now

What

1

case is the plaintiff must have presented evidence of

2

economic pecuniary damages that directly result or relate to

3

the failure of Litton to respond to the January 4, 2001

4

letter.

5

authority indicate that actual damages include out-of-pocket

6

expenses, anything that relate to the failure whether - if

7

they had to go down and, you know, make copies, drive to

8

Houston, meet with people.

9

economic, pecuniary damages.

The cases that have been provided to you and the

Those kind of things would be
There has been absolutely zero

10

evidence presented by the plaintiff of any economic pecuniary

11

damages.

12

Court with respect to her emotional condition and how that

13

made her feel, that now has been stricken from this case.

14

There's been zero evidence on damages.

15

no evidence on damages that the jury has to even consider.

16

It's an element of a 2605(e) cause of action, the fourth

17

element that the plaintiff has the burden of proof to present

18

evidence on.

19

ask that the court direct the verdict and - for the defendant

20

and dismiss this action.

The only evidence that's been placed before the

Evidence has been zero.

21

THE COURT:

22

Any response, Mr. Oliver?

23

MR. OLIVER:

Therefore, there is

Therefore, we would

Thank you.

Yes, Your Honor.

First off, Motion

24

for Directed Verdict is not timely at the close of

25

defendant's case. The only time when a Motion for a Directed
10

1

Verdict can be received by the Court is at the close of the

2

plaintiff's case.

3

now are not timely before this Court.

4

for a post judgment motion; however, with regards to a post

5

judgment motion, specifically a JNOV, the circumstances are

6

that in order to make a motion for a JNOV it's my

7

understanding that you first have to make a motion for a

8

directed verdict.

9

at that time and so consequently I think it's inappropriate

So both the motions that are being made
It may be appropriate

The damages aspect of it was not preserved

10

and certainly not something for the Court to consider at this

11

particular point in time.

12

Having said that with regards to the damages, I

13

would indicate to the Court this, that there that has been a

14

great deal of discussion including the last questions posed

15

to Ms. Mast about what she did after and including, and it

16

went on all the way up through forever.

17

the foreclosure, they talked about bankruptcy, they've talked

18

about all sorts of things.

19

that has been testified to is that - well, strike that.

20

They've talked about

I think that one of the things

We're entitled to nominal damages if we prevail that

21

indeed Litton didn't do anything on the case and they

22

received the letter.

23

it's nominal damages which we're not going to suggest that it

24

will be, but even if it's nominal damages, we're still

25

entitled for this to go to the jury.

And so at that point in time, even if

11

1

One of the cases that counsel provided in support

2

of his jury instructions and I'll have to look for that if

3

the Court wishes me to do that and it's Utah Supreme Court

4

case and in reviewing this, it states specifically that the

5

Court itself cannot limit the damages, that that is a jury

6

question.

7

proximate cause or other types of cause and it says,

8

"proximate cause is that cause which in the natural and

9

continuous sequence unbroken by an efficient intervening

And it talks about causation, direct cause,

10

cause, produces the injury and without which the result would

11

not have occurred.

12

necessarily sets in operation the factors that accomplish the

13

injury.

14

examination of the facts and questions of fact are to be

15

decided by the jury.

16

directed verdict on issues of causation if there is any

17

evidence which might lead to a reasonable jury to find causal

18

connection between a breach and a subsequent injury."

19

It is the efficient cause, the one that

Proximate cause is generally determined by an

Thus, courts should refuse to grant a

This particular case, we have been, from the very

20

beginning, prohibited from going into the damages that flowed

21

from this and if indeed the defendant believed that there was

22

an intervening cause that would give rise to that, then at

23

that particular point in time then the defendant should be

24

allowed to present that and then the jury make that

25

determination.

That determination has been made by this
12

1

Court and we have endeavored, I have endeavored to stay

2

within the confines of what the Court has instructed me in

3

this trial.

4

that, including introducing evidence of what we believe was a

5

fraud with regards to the assignment of trust deed and we

6

believe that that's a clear fraud.

7

have been effective impeachment material.

8

and I have tried to stay, like I said within the guidelines

9

and the rulings that this Court has made.

10

We believe that we've been severely hampered by

We believe that would
We have gone on

Now, it has expanded out from there because of the

11

defendant and the way that they have prosecuted this case

12

including on direct examination of their own witness, I mean,

13

they went up to incidents that went several months beyond

14

whether or not the letter was received.

15

So, under the circumstances, Your Honor, the

16

defendant has continually tried to push the envelope on their

17

side, continually tried to restrict us on our side.

We've

18

continually tried to comply with the Court's order.

When the

19

door has been opened by defendant, then I've gone a little

20

bit further but I've really not tried to even push it too far

21

at that time.

22

believe that the damages is an issue that the jury should be

23

allowed to decide and that's not an issue that this Court

24

should take away from the jury but should leave it to the

25

jury.

I've not taken advantage of things but we do

13

1

THE COURT:

2

MR. LEE:

Thank you.
First of all, Your Honor, (inaudible) ask

3

for a directed verdict motion to be made at the end of

4

plaintiff's and the end of the presentation of all evidence.

5

We made such a motion both times.

6

Secondly, there's a threshold decision that is a

7

judge's decision and that is the simple question, has any

8

evidence been presented to the jury of economic damages?

9

There's been no evidence that Ms. Mast spent *x' dollars,

10

incurred this expense.

11

and therefore as a threshold question, the Court must make

12

that decision as to is there any evidence whatsoever that can

13

go to the jury under the law as the Court will instruct and

14

our position is there is absolutely no evidence from anybody

15

of economic, pecuniary damages.

16

They can't just pull a number out of the air.

17

have some evidence to base it on, testimony that I incurred

18

*x' dollars or I spent this amount or I did this that relates

19

to Litton's failure to respond.

20

that and so there is no evidence for a jury to even weigh and

21

evaluate and that is a threshold question for the Court.

22

THE COURT:

There's zero for the jury to decide

Thank you.

So what can the jury do?

There is zero evidence on

I'm going to take your

23

motion under advisement at this point in time.

24

let the case go to the jury.

25

They have to

I have a practical matter.

I am going to

There has been some
14

1

inquiry about the jurors.

I guess they haven't asked but

2

they've - let me back up.

We need to decide how long we want

3

to hold the jurors tonight once we get them out.

4

- I'll do whatever you two gentlemen prefer.

5

stay and go later into the evening or if you want to send

6

them home at 5:00 even if they've just started their

7

deliberations or if they haven't reached one or what.

8

your guys preference.

9

MR. OLIVER:

Do you want

If you want to

It's

What would you —
My preference, Your Honor, is that we

10

hold them for a reasonable time after 5:00 unless they

11

protest significantly to that.

12

sitting back and saying, Hey, we've got this and this and

13

this and cannot do it, that's one thing, but I actually

14

prefer that the Court hold them for a reasonable time, say

15

until 8:00 or so (inaudible).

In other words, if they're

16

MR. LEE:

I agree with that,

17

THE COURT:

18

(Whereupon the jury entered the courtroom)

19 I

(End of requested transcript)

All right.

Thank you.

20
21
22
23
24
25 i
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THE COURT: For the record, it didn't look like the

- because of the timeliness of complying with Rule 7 and the
date when this trial was to set, we may not have had the
motion go its full length of Rule 7 and had a notice to
submit on it submitted to the court, but regardless a
decision needs to be made with respect to the damages and I'm
going to rule that the damages will be limited to the sole
remaining issues of that alleged violation of the RESPA and
therefore you will not be able to put on any evidence of the
foreclosure or damages resulting from the foreclosure of the
home, and this oral minute entry will stand as the order of
the Court concerning that motion in limine on the
introduction of the damages evidence.

All right?

(End of requested transcript - 1:24:55)
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